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INTRODUCTION 
Today, copyright infringement is made possible because of the 
technology available in our digital world.1  Digital technology 
includes computers, storage devices, and peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-
sharing services.2  So if one combines these and connects them to a 
media player, like an Apple TV, he or she can choose from 
countless unauthorized files of copyrighted material to enjoy on a 
big screen television set.  In fact, one can do this within minutes, 
without the tedious intermediary step of obtaining permission from 
the copyright holders.3  But who should be liable for the copyright 
infringement?  The situation below illustrates the different roles 
involved in a typical act of copyright infringement.  While reading 
it, one should try to decide who should be held liable: 
 
 1 Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Apple Rips While Grokster Burns: How MGM 
v. Grokster Benefits Information Technology Companies, FINDLAW LEGAL NEWS & 
COMMENTARY, Jun. 29, 2005, http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20050629_ 
sunder.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
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College student, Billy, likes to spend his Sunday afternoons 
downloading free popular songs and movies he had just heard and 
watched on Friday and Saturday nights.  On one particular Sunday 
afternoon, Billy decides he wants to download the new Borat 
movie,4 so he logs on to BitTorrent, a P2P file-distribution tool that 
allows his computer to trade information with another computer 
directly.5  After performing a quick search for Borat on BitTorrent, 
Billy gets a list of computers that are readily available to send him 
the information he wants.  He selects one computer, and with the 
click of a button and a few seconds, Billy has the Borat movie 
downloaded onto his computer.  Now he decides he wants to watch 
the movie, but his seventeen-inch computer screen is much too 
small to enjoy it.  So Billy decides to watch Borat on his sixty-inch 
flat screen television for better picture, sound and viewing quality.  
Grabbing his new Apple TV, a set-top box (“STB”),6 he wirelessly 
transfers that digital video clip stored in his computer onto his 
television.  With this elaborate setup, Billy enjoys the Borat film 
for free, instead of purchasing or renting it from a local retailer, 
and it only took a few minutes of his time. 
Many courts would agree that Billy is liable for directly 
infringing the copyrights of Borat.  But should hardware 
manufacturers of devices that help facilitate copyright 
infringement, like Apple, also be held liable for the direct 
infringement of its users?  What if its products are well-known for 
holding unauthorized copyrighted works?  Should P2P file-sharing 
services be held liable for the copyright infringement?  If P2P file-
sharing services intend to induce copyright infringement with 
advertisements, should they be held liable?  If Apple does not 
intend for its products, like Apple TV, to induce copyright 
 
 4 BORAT: CULTURAL LEARNINGS OF AMERICA FOR MAKE BENEFIT GLORIOUS NATION 
OF KAZAKHSTAN (20th Century Fox 2006). 
 5 Electronic Commerce, Glossary, http://www.martech-intl.com/best2/glossary.htm 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2007) (defining peer-to-peer as a process “involving linking a series 
of PCs together without the use of a server”); Wikipedia.org, BitTorrent, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent (last visited Mar. 1, 2007) (defining BitTorrent as 
a peer-to-peer (P2P) file distribution protocol written by programmer Bram Cohen and 
debuted at CodeCon 2002). 
 6 Wikipedia.org, Apple TV, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_TV (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2007). 
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infringement, but the Apple TV nonetheless does, should it be held 
liable as a contributory infringer?  What if it uses contemporary 
internet lingo to advertise Apple TV’s ability to “Rip, Mix, Burn”7 
videos to potential users, as it did with the iPod?  Is it liable then?  
Perhaps, under the new “intent to induce” theory adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster.8 
This Note shows that there are two ways to read the “intent to 
induce” theory announced in Grokster III, one of which would 
leave practically all manufacturers and distributors of digital 
technology susceptible to liability.  According to the Grokster III 
Court, defendants Grokster and StreamCast were potentially liable 
for “inducing” copyright infringement.9  The Court held that 
“inducement” meant, “one who distributes a device with the object 
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear 
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, 
is liable” for a third party’s infringement.10  Originally, plaintiff, 
MGM, brought a cause of action against the defendants under the 
traditional theories of secondary liability, namely, contributory 
infringement and vicarious infringement.11  However, 
defendants—like other P2P file-sharing services—claimed 
protection under Sony Corporation of America v. Universal 
Studios, Inc.12  Essentially, this rule of law entitles products or 
services “capable of substantial noninfringing uses” to 
manufacture and distribution protection, even if they would 
otherwise be held responsible under the theory of contributory 
 
 7 See Kathy Bowrey, Rip, Mix, Burn: The Politics of Peer to Peer and Copyright Law, 
FIRST MONDAY, Jul. 22, 2005, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_8/bowrey 
(citing LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 9 (Random House 2001)). 
 8 (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 9 Id. at 941.  The Supreme Court could not determine the defendants’ liability because 
the case was appealing the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and the Court had to 
base its decision on facts accepted at the district court level.  The case was therefore 
remanded to the district court to determine the defendants’ liability. See Grokster III, 
545 U.S. at 927. 
 10 Id. at 936–37. 
 11 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 259 F. Supp. 2d 
1029, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2003), overruled by Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913. 
 12 See Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), stating that, “StreamCast has adduced evidence that the 
Morpheus program is regularly used to facilitate and search for public domain materials, 
government documents . . . .”). 
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infringement.13  However, the Court did not hold the defendants 
liable under either of the traditional theories, instead focusing on 
the inapplicability of the Sony defense to the defendants, and then 
announcing the new rule.  So it left readers wondering how to 
properly interpret the inducement theory.14  Knowing this 
background of Grokster III, one can see that there are two ways the 
theory can be read.  First, it can be read as a rebuttal against the 
Sony defense for claims of contributory infringement.  Or, it can be 
read as a new cause of action under secondary liability.  The first 
reading effectively sets boundaries on the Sony defense.  However, 
allowing copyright holders to bring a wholly separate cause of 
action against contributory infringers under the second reading 
preempts defendants from using the Sony defense altogether.  Such 
a reading is beneficial for copyright holders looking to pin the 
responsibility for copyright infringement on corporations with 
deep pockets.  But is this the desired result? 
Reading the inducement theory as a new cause of action creates 
liability for new technologies worthy of the Sony defense, like the 
Apple TV.15  However, it is important to understand that the 
Grokster III Court never wanted to hold digital technology 
producers, like Apple, liable for facilitating copyright 
infringement.  Rather, the Court preferred to uphold the policy 
expressed in Sony: to balance the dissemination of new digital 
technology products, while also giving copyright holders their fair 
protection.16  That is, the Grokster III Court sought not to answer 
the question of who should be held liable, but rather, how to 
prevent further copyright infringement when using products of 
information technology. 
 
 13 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
 14 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934 (stating that the Ninth Circuit reading was in error 
because it did not displace other theories of secondary liability and then continuing with 
the inducement theory after dismissing the Ninth’s Circuit’s reading); William Sloan 
Coats, Mark R. Weinstein, Erik R. Zimmerman, Pre- and Post-Grokster Copyright 
Infringement Liability for Secondary and Tertiary Parties, 842 PLI/Pat 221, 242–43 
(2005). 
 15 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 243. 
 16 See Transcript of Oral Argument at *12–13, Grokster III, 545 U.S, 913 (No. 04-480) 
(questioning plaintiffs’ proposed test for a “majority use [that is] non-infringing”).  
Justice Breyer argues that it presents problems for the iPod inventor who cannot gauge its 
unforeseen uses before he has invented it. Id. 
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This Note attempts to illustrate how the Supreme Court 
addresses the copyright infringement problem today, while at the 
same time maintaining the safe harbor of Sony17 for products of 
information technology in Grokster III.18  This Note argues that the 
Grokster III holding must be read as a rebuttal to the Sony defense 
under the contributory infringement theory in cases of secondary 
liability.  To view the inducement theory as a new cause of action 
under secondary liability could lead to its misapplication, striking 
the wrong balance between dissemination and protection.  In fact, 
it would preclude new technologies, like the Apple TV, from 
developing substantial noninfringing uses.19 
Part I of this Note discusses the history of secondary liability.  
Part I.A gives the background of the original theories and the 
article of commerce doctrine.  Part I.B discusses the Sony decision.  
Part II addresses the legal consequences of Sony’s inconsistent 
definition of “substantial noninfringing uses.”20  Part II.A begins 
with a short description of how P2P file-sharing works.  Part II.B 
delineates the Grokster II and Grokster III21 decisions in the Ninth 
Circuit and Supreme Court.  Part II.C addresses Congress’ role in 
the Grokster III decision.  Part III discusses the different ways to 
read the Grokster III decision and their possible implications.  Part 
III.A uses the Apple TV to illustrate how Grokster III should not 
be read.  Part III.B. reconciles the Sony and Grokster III decisions 
by using the Apple TV to show that the Grokster III holding must 
be read as part of contributory infringement and a rebuttal to the 
Sony decision.  Part IV briefly summarizes the point of this Note 
that the Grokster III decision never intended to eliminate the Sony 
protection. 
 
 17 464 U.S. at 442. 
 18 Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913. 
 19 For a discussion of other gaps in secondary liability theory by the Grokster decision, 
see Britton Payne, Note, Super-Grokster: Untangling Secondary Liability, Comic Book 
Heroes and the DMCA, and a Filtering Solution for Infringing Digital Creations, 
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 939 (2006). 
 20 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (defining substantial noninfringing uses as “capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses” in one passage and “commercially significant 
noninfringing uses” in another passage). 
 21 Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913. 
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I. HOW DID COURTS HOLD MANUFACTURERS AND  
DISTRIBUTORS OF PRODUCTS CAPABLE OF COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT LIABLE IN A PRE-GROKSTER III WORLD?   
THE HISTORY OF SECONDARY LIABILITY 
Before the Grokster III decision, courts traditionally held 
producers and providers liable for third party copyright 
infringements under theories of vicarious liability and contributory 
infringement.22  P2P service users directly infringe on copyright 
owners’ exclusive rights to reproduce, produce derivatives, 
distribute copies, and publicly perform or display their work under 
§ 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act when P2P users transmit 
copyrighted work without owners’ permission.23  Parties are held 
responsible under secondary liability for this infringement if they 
have some degree of involvement in the direct infringement.24  The 
theories of secondary liability were not codified in the Copyright 
Act.  Instead, the Supreme Court and lower courts adopted them 
over time as needed from the Patent Act, where they are expressly 
stated, even though the Patent Act entitles holders to a completely 
different intellectual property right.25  Congress has also 
acknowledged the theories of secondary liability for copyright law 
in legislative history.26  The “staple articles of commerce” doctrine 
as construed by Sony is a defense to these liability theories that will 
also be discussed.27 
A. Origins of Secondary Liability Theories and the Staple Article 
of Commerce Doctrine 
Vicarious liability for acts of direct infringement is imposed on 
a secondary party if that party has a right and ability to control 
infringing conduct and derives a financial benefit from that 
 
 22 Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, 
Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 868–72 (2004). 
 23 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); see also Coats et al., supra note 14, at 226–27 (2005). 
 24 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 227. 
 25 Id. at 226–27; see also Lynda J. Oswald, The Intent Element of “Inducement to 
Infringe” Under Patent Law: Reflections on Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 225, 225–26 (2006). 
 26 Feder, supra note 22, at 868–69. 
 27 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
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conduct.28  This Note does not focus on vicarious liability because 
the Sony and Grokster III decisions focused on the defendants’ 
liability under a theory of contributory infringement.29  It is worthy 
to note, though, that vicarious liability is a cause of action 
copyright holders typically bring in addition to contributory 
infringement, but the defendants’ primary defense is Sony and 
courts almost always associate that defense with contributory 
infringement.30  So, if defendants are found not to be contributory 
infringers, as the defendants in Sony, they are also not liable for 
vicarious infringement.31  Also, if defendants are found to be 
contributory infringers, as the defendants in Grokster III, that is 
enough to find them liable and the court will not address the 
vicarious liability issue.32 
Under its traditional standard, a party is a contributory infringer 
if it has “knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.”33  
Depending on the alleged contributory infringer’s degree of 
involvement in the infringing activity, knowledge of the direct 
infringer’s conduct is satisfied by either actual or constructive 
knowledge of the infringing activity.34  Under Fonovisa, Inc. v. 
Cherry Auction, Inc., material contribution usually refers to 
 
 28 Feder, supra note 22, at 869. 
 29 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 931 n.9 (2005) 
(stating that, because the Court resolved the case on an inducement theory, there was no 
need for it to analyze the vicarious liability claim); Sony, 464 U.S. at 456 (holding that 
the sale of VTRs to the general public did not constitute contributory infringement). 
 30 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 931 n.9 (stating that, because the Court resolved the 
case on an inducement theory, there was no need for it to analyze the vicarious liability 
claim); In re Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster II), 334 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).  
The Court recognized that the differences between direct infringement, contributory 
infringement, and vicarious liability were not clear.  Thus, when Sony used the term 
“vicarious liability” it did so outside the technical analysis of the vicarious copyright 
infringement doctrine; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 
239 F.3d 1004, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 & n.17). 
 31 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 931 n.9; Sony, 464 U.S. at 422. 
 32 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 931 n.9 (stating that, because the Court resolved the 
case on an inducement theory, there was no need for it to analyze the vicarious liability 
claim). 
 33 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 
(2d Cir. 1971); Feder, supra note 22, at 871. 
 34 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 227 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439). 
DAVID_FINAL_050807 5/8/2007  1:09:39 PM 
2007 GROKSTER AND APPLE TV 1205 
providing the “site and facilities” for the direct infringement to 
take place.35  It can also mean engaging in behavior that qualifies 
as “substantial participation” in the infringing act.36  The copyright 
version of contributory infringement is derived from the tort 
concept of enterprise liability.37  In enterprise liability, the person 
who knowingly participates in an enterprise, or an unlawful 
activity, is held to be just as responsible for the consequences that 
result from that enterprise as his partner or partners in that 
enterprise, even if his or her role is only a subsidiary one.38 
Traditionally, courts used secondary liability theories to hold 
beneficiaries of direct copyright infringement accountable for that 
direct copyright infringement.39  However, as technology 
developed, courts and Congress had to increasingly consider how 
to construct the law so as to allow for works protected under 
copyright to be more easily accessible to society.40  A prime 
example of the promotion of this policy was the Sony case, in 
which the courts sought to protect the advancement of technology, 
even where it was clear that the technology could be used to 
infringe copyrights.41  There, the courts had to weigh the interests 
of copyright holders in their right to protection against distributors’ 
right to competition and society’s right to copyrighted goods.42  So 
the Court again adopted another theory from patent law and used 
 
 35 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Coats et al., supra note 14, at 227; 
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163. 
 36 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 227 (quoting Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163). 
 37 Feder, supra note 22, at 871. 
 38 Id. at 871–72. 
 39 Id. at 870 (“imposing cost on the beneficiary of the infringement . . . satisfies basic 
notions of fairness and reasonableness”); see Oswald, supra note 25 at 225–26. 
 40 See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 440 
(1984) (referencing the patent law justification for adopting the staple article of 
commerce doctrine: “[w]hen a charge of contributory infringement is predicated entirely 
on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by the purchaser to infringe a patent, the 
public interest in access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated”); see also 
id. at 428–29 (stating that, under the Constitution, Congress is charged with defining the 
scope of a copyright holder’s monopoly). 
 41 See id. at 423 (finding that “time-shifting” was the primary, legal use of the VTR, but 
a survey also showed that a substantial number of interviewees were building libraries of 
tapes, which was not deemed legal); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster II), 
334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 42 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
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the “staple article of commerce” doctrine to determine how to 
properly weigh these interests.43 
Section 271(c) of Title 35 defines a staple article of commerce 
by giving a narrow list of non-staple articles of commerce44.  This 
list only includes those items that have “no commercial use except 
in connection with [the] patented invention.”45  This means that 
only those articles that are capable of substantial non-commercial, 
noninfringing uses are staple articles of commerce.46 
In Sony, the Court reasoned that the “staple article of 
commerce” doctrine could be adopted by copyright law because of 
the “historic kinship” that patent and copyright law shared.47  
Indeed, the kinship the Sony Court referred to probably was the 
practice of exporting secondary liability theories from patent law 
into copyright law.48  As will be shown below, after Sony, any 
inquiry into whether or not a product is a “staple article of 
commerce” entails application of the substantive “capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses” standard.49 
Various lawsuits against P2P providers have applied the Sony 
holding to determine whether or not their services are entitled to 
protection.50  Copyright holders have depended on interpreting the 
meaning of “capable of substantial noninfringing uses” to hold P2P 
providers liable.51 
B. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc. 
In 1976, owners of copyright in television programming sued 
Sony for manufacturing and distributing Betamax videotape 
 
 43 Id. at 440 
 44 Feder, supra note 22, at 889 (quoting Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 
448 U.S. 176, 200 (1980)). 
 45 Id. (quoting Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 184). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Sony, 464 U.S. at 439. 
 48 See Coats et al., supra note 14, at 226–27. 
 49 See id. at 442; Feder, supra note 222, at 889. 
 50 See Coats et al., supra note 14, at 232. 
 51 See Feder, supra note 22, at 888 (giving three justifications plaintiffs have used to 
distinguish Sony from the defendants’ cases in Napster II and Aimster II). 
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recorders (“VTRs”).52  VTRs enabled consumers to make 
unauthorized copies of their programming by including a tuner 
device that could record television broadcasts, including plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted audiovisual work.53  Consequently, copyright owners 
asked the trial court to find Sony liable for copyright infringement 
under the theory of contributory infringement.54  Under these 
theories, Sony was alleged to provide consumers with the means to 
infringe plaintiffs’ copyrights.55  Indeed, the district court found 
that some of the Betamax users were creating libraries of tapes so 
they could watch programs multiple times, which was an 
unauthorized use of the product.56  However, the trial court also 
found that the primary use of the VTR was “time-shifting,” which 
means recording a program that was broadcast on television, 
watching it once at a later time, and then erasing the recording.57  
Time-shifting was considered a legitimate use of the product.58  
When the Supreme Court decided the case, it discussed the 
significance of these findings to determine if Sony should be held 
contributorily liable.59 
The issue to be decided by the Court was framed this way: 
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, 
it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with 
constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may 
use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted material.  There is no precedent in the law of 
copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a 
theory.60 
The Supreme Court used vicarious liability and contributory 
infringement interchangeably and refused to hold Sony liable for 
 
 52 Sony, 464 U.S. at 422; Feder, supra note 22, at 872.  The VTR is also the forerunner 
of the videocassette recorder (VCR). Coats et al., supra note 14, at 228. 
 53 Sony, 464 U.S. at 422. 
 54 Id. at 420. 
 55 Id. at 436 (citing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)). 
 56 See id. at 423. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 442. 
 59 Id. at 443–47. 
 60 Id. at 439. 
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contributory infringement based on a finding of constructive 
knowledge.61 
To determine Sony’s liability under contributory infringement, 
the Supreme Court did not address its separate elements.62  Instead, 
it applied the staple article of commerce doctrine to the issue of 
copyright law in this case.63  It reasoned that, “[w]hen a charge of 
contributory infringement is predicated entirely on the sale of an 
article of commerce that is used by the purchaser to infringe [an 
intellectual property right], the public interest in access to that 
article of commerce is necessarily implicated.”64  Under the 
doctrine, the Court found that a manufacturer of copying 
equipment can defeat a claim of contributory infringement if the 
manufacturer shows that the product is capable of “substantial 
noninfringing” or “commercially significant noninfringing” uses.65  
Since the Court found that the Betamax was capable of such 
noninfringing uses, it was shielded from contributory infringement, 
even if the elements of knowledge and participation were met.66 
The court did not define, or quantify, “commercially significant 
noninfringing” uses.  In Sony’s case, just one capability of the 
VTR, time-shifting, was enough to establish its “commercially 
significant noninfringing” use.67  The Supreme Court determined 
that this potential use was substantially noninfringing for two 
reasons.  First, the Court focused on the quantity of unauthorized 
use.  It noted that the plaintiffs’ programs collectively represented 
less than ten percent of the total broadcast market, and that the 
outcome of the litigation would have a significant impact on the 
 
 61 In re Aimster Copyright Litig (Aimster II), 334 F. 3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).  The 
Court recognized that the differences between direct infringement, contributory 
infringement, and vicarious liability were not clear.  Thus, when Sony used the term 
“vicarious liability” it did so outside the technical analysis of the vicarious copyright 
infringement doctrine. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 
1004, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 435). 
 62 Feder, supra note 22, at 875. 
 63 Sony, 464 U.S. at 439–40. 
 64 Id. at 440. 
 65 See id. at 442. 
 66 Id.; Feder, supra note 22, at 876. 
 67 Feder, supra note 22, at 876; Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; Coats et al., supra note 14, 
at 229. 
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other ninety percent.68  This ninety percent included copyright 
owners who had no objection to viewers taping their programs at 
home.69  Since the quantity of authorized use was significant 
enough to outweigh unauthorized time-shifting of the plaintiffs’ 
programming, the Court refused to hold Sony liable for 
contributory infringement.70 
Second, the Court focused on quality.  Even if time-shifting 
plaintiffs’ programming was unauthorized, the Court found it was 
fair use and the VTR was capable of substantial noninfringing uses 
because it was non-commercial and did not cause plaintiffs any 
significant harm.71  Accordingly, Sony’s sale of the Betamax 
VTRs was not an act of contributory infringement.72 
In determining Sony’s liability, the Supreme Court 
inconsistently expressed when the “substantial noninfringing uses” 
protection should apply.  This allowed the circuit courts to decide 
for themselves the significance of a product’s potential or existing 
noninfringing uses.  Eventually, different interpretations of 
“substantial noninfringing” uses caused a split in the circuit courts 
and set the stage for Grokster III.73  In one passage, the Court 
stated that the technology owner must show that its product “need 
merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses” in order to be 
protected.74  However, in discussing Sony’s liability, the Court said 
that the question was, “whether the Betamax is capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses.”75  This passage 
suggests that the existing noninfringing uses must be “substantial 
and commercially significant” to trigger protection from 
contributory infringement claims.76  So, depending on how the 
 
 68 Sony, 464 U.S. at 443. 
 69 See id. 
 70 Id. at 446 (reasoning that a finding of contributory infringement would “frustrate the 
interests of broadcasters” included in the ninety percent who did not object to time-
shifting). 
 71 Id. at 454 (quoting the district court opinion). 
 72 Id. at 456. 
 73 Karen M. Kramer, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster—The Supreme Court’s 
Balancing Act Between the Risks of Third-Party Liability for Copyright Infringement and 
Rewards of Innovation, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 169, 173 (2005). 
 74 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
 75 Kramer, supra note 73, at 173 (emphasis added) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. 442). 
 76 Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442). 
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deciding court interprets “substantial noninfringing uses” in Sony, 
either a nominal or strong showing of legitimate, noninfringing 
uses will protect manufacturers or distributors who would 
otherwise be implicated for contributory infringement.77  In P2P 
file distribution cases of contributory infringement, Circuit Courts 
were split on how much weight to give evidence of legitimate 
noninfringing uses.78  Therefore, while the Ninth Circuit in 
Napster and Grokster II focused on the “capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses” aspect of Sony, the Seventh Circuit in Aimster 
focused on the “capable of commercially significant noninfringing 
uses” language.79 
II. CHANGING SECONDARY LIABILITY HISTORY:  
THE DIGITAL WORLD AND THE GROKSTER III DECISION 
A. What is P2P File-Sharing? 
P2P file distribution systems enable their users to reproduce 
and distribute digital files, including digital files containing 
copyrighted works over the Internet.80  Most of these are 
unauthorized transmittals of music and video files and they 
infringe on owners’ copyrights.81  Several courts determined these 
transmittals were not fair use primarily because users were making 
exact replicates of the music, which significantly conflicted with 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 174. 
 79 Id. at 1160; see also id. at 1162 n.9 (contrasting the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation 
of the standard in Sony, 464 U.S. at 1161); see In re Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster 
II), 334 F.3d 643, 653 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring a weighing of the probabilities alleged 
for significant noninfringing uses to show that they could actually be used as 
noninfringing); see also Seth A. Miller, Peer-to-Peer File Distribution: An Analysis of 
Design, Liability, Litigation, and Potential Solutions, 25 REV. LITIG. 181, 206 (2006) 
(finding that the Ninth Circuit’s reading of Sony differed greatly from the Seventh 
Circuit’s, focusing on the capability for substantial noninfringing uses). 
 80 See Coats et al., supra note 14, at 231–32; In re Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster 
II), 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 81 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 917–21 
(2005). 
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copyright owners’ exclusive rights.82  Creators or operators of 
these P2P systems are not the ones who are actually reproducing or 
distributing digital files.83  Instead, the systems create a means for 
users to directly receive and send digital files to each other, rather 
than by downloading from a single server.84  This process of 
downloading from other computers occurs in three steps.  First, a 
user (this user is called the downloader) searches for another user 
computer with the desired file (this user is called the uploader).85  
Then, the Internet Protocol address (“IP address”) of the uploader 
would be communicated to the downloader.86  Finally, the 
downloader directly connects to the uploader and obtains the 
desired file.87  In cases of copyright infringement against P2P 
networks, the searchable index of downloadable files for each 
service was different and courts inquired into the type of 
searchable index employed by the service to determine how much 
knowledge the service had of users’ infringing activity.88 
For example, even though music files were downloaded 
directly from other Napster users, Napster maintained the 
searchable index of files users downloaded from.89  The Napster 
software helped users directly infringe by searching its index of 
files for the user’s desired file, and then communicating the IP 
address of the uploader to the downloader.90  In helping copyright 
infringers find those copyrighted files, Napster was deemed to be 
clearly involved with helping the copyright infringers 
 
 82 See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 
2001) (finding that merely copying digital copyrighted files does not add anything to the 
work, and courts have been reluctant to find fair use when the original work is merely re-
transmitted in a different medium (citing Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 
104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 
351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))). 
 83 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 920–21 (stating that Grokster and StreamCast were 
sued for their users’ reproduction and distribution of copyrighted work). 
 84 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 231–32. 
 85 Id. at 232–33. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 233. 
 88 Id. at 232. 
 89 See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I), 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 906 (N.D. Cal. 
2000), aff’d by, A & M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001); Coats et al., supra note 14, at 232. 
 90 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 907; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 232–33. 
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communicate.91  Like Napster, Aimster also operated a central 
index of digital files on its server and that was also deemed 
illegal.92 
After the central index was determined to be in violation of 
copyright law, new P2P file-sharing services emerged93 that did 
not maintain a central index of available files on their own 
servers.94  This lack of a central index made it harder to determine 
how much, if any, involvement the P2P networks had in helping 
users directly infringe.95  Soon after Napster, these new P2P 
networks used one of two means of indexing files available for 
download.  One method used by StreamCast was a decentralized 
system.96  In the decentralized system, the software allowed users 
to search for files in the searchable index of every individual user 
in the network.97  The other type of indexing employed by 
Grokster allowed a few computers, called “supernode computers,” 
on the network to be designated as hosts for indexes.98  These 
supernode computers located the computers near them on the 
network and compiled a list of all the files available on those 
computers.  Downloaders would then retrieve the desired files 
from the supernode computers.99  In both the decentralized and 
supernode indexing systems, the distributor of the file-sharing 
software did not maintain the infringing files on its own server.100  
Because the copyrighted works were being transmitted directly 
between the users, Grokster and StreamCast were simply providing 
copyright infringers with the software needed to find that 
network.101  Therefore, it was harder to determine how much 
 
 91 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 907; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 232–33. 
 92 Feder, supra note 22, at 884; Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 64. 
 93 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 235. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163 (finding that the design of Grokster and StreamCast did 
not allow them to have actual knowledge of the direct infringement); Coats et al., supra 
note 14, at 235. 
 96 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 235. 
 97 Id.; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1159. 
 98 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 235; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163. 
 99 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163. 
 100 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236. 
 101 Id. at 235–36. 
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involvement the P2P file-sharing services had, and if they were in 
fact contributory infringers. 
While the Ninth Circuit decided Napster and the Seventh 
Circuit decided Aimster, they both addressed the question of 
whether a P2P service was secondarily liable under Sony 
differently, but arrived at the same conclusion.102  How these 
competing approaches were resolved will be discussed in the 
context of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Grokster III.  Congress’ 
role in the matter, as well as the consequences of the Grokster III 
decision will also be discussed. 
B. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster, Ltd. 
The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Grokster II 
and Grokster III were based on the same facts, yet both took 
starkly different paths in determining copyright holders’ rights 
against secondary infringers.103  The Ninth Circuit approach and 
the Supreme Court decision were based on the facts accepted in the 
district court for purposes of defendants’ summary judgment 
motion.104  Copyright owners alleged that ninety percent of the 
digital files exchanged by users of defendants’ software were 
infringing and that the copyright owners owned seventy percent of 
that material.105  Despite these allegations, the district court 
granted Grokster and StreamCast partial summary judgment on the 
issues of contributory and vicarious infringement.106  The Ninth 
Circuit then affirmed that ruling based on its own interpretation of 
Sony.107  Conversely, the Supreme Court did not use a Sony 
interpretation to determine Grokster’s and StreamCast’s liability.  
Instead, the defendants were held potentially liable under a new 
 
 102 Feder, supra note 22, at 879–80. 
 103 See generally Grokster III, 545 U.S, 913; Grokster II, 380 F.3d 1154. 
 104 Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236. 
 105 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 
(Grokster II), 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’g Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), rev’d by Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (citing district 
court opinion). 
 106 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1157. 
 107 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 927–28. 
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theory of inducement.108 The following discusses the two different 
approaches in Grokster II and Grokster III.109 
1. The Ninth Circuit Approach 
In Grokster II, the Ninth Circuit extended the contributory 
infringement analysis that it developed in Napster by adding a 
timing element.110  Adding this timing element effectively raised 
the knowledge requirement for holding P2P services liable under 
that analysis.111  As in Napster, the court first determined if the 
service was capable of significant lawful uses.  If it was not, the 
defendants would not receive the Sony protection and plaintiffs 
only had to show constructive knowledge of users’ direct 
infringement.112  But, even if the service was capable of significant 
lawful uses, the court would not automatically give it Sony 
protection.113  Under Napster, if a service was found to be capable 
of significant lawful uses, plaintiffs had to prove “reasonable 
knowledge of specific infringing files” to find defendants liable.114  
But in Grokster II, the court also held that defendants had to have 
actual knowledge at a time when they were “either materially 
contributing to the infringement or failing to stop it.”115 
When the Ninth Circuit applied this new rule, it first held that 
Grokster’s and StreamCast’s software were capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.116  It focused on the “capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses” aspect of Sony, finding that Grokster was 
capable of uses such as debuting unpublished artists’ works.117  In 
one case, it even led to a record deal for a band.118  Even if such 
uses only constituted ten percent of the total activities as the 
 
 108 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 
(Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005). 
 109 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1157; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236. 
 110 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161. 
 111 See id. at 1161–62; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236. 
 112 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161–62; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236. 
 113 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161–62. 
 114 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161 (citing Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004). 
 115 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162. 
 116 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 237; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162. 
 117 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161. 
 118 Id. (referring to Wilco receiving a new recording contract after the successful debut 
of its work on Grokster). 
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plaintiffs alleged, that was not enough to prove that the software 
was not incapable of substantial lawful uses.119  Instead, the ten 
percent represented a substantial number of lawful uses.120  This 
reading of Sony differed from the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation 
of Aimster, which favored the Sony passage stating that the product 
must be “capable of commercially significant noninfringing 
uses.”121 
Under Aimster, the Seventh Circuit would weigh the alleged 
commercial viability of the substantial noninfringing uses against 
the infringing uses.122  However, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
this case was distinguished from Aimster because Grokster and 
StreamCast actually brought forth evidence showing legitimate 
uses.123  The record deal that resulted from debuting the band’s 
work and the fact that Grokster had been used to share public 
domain works created a sufficient probability that they had actual 
noninfringing uses and were therefore entitled to the Sony 
protection.124  Because the defendants’ software was capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses, the plaintiffs would have to show 
that the defendants had actual knowledge of infringement in order 
to hold them liable.125 
The design of Grokster and StreamCast played a significant 
role in the court’s determination of their liability for contributory 
infringement.126  The Ninth Circuit held that the defendants did not 
have actual knowledge of the direct infringement127 because the 
design of Grokster’s and StreamCast’s systems did not allow them 
 
 119 Id. at 1162. 
 120 Id. at 1162 n.10. 
 121 Id. at 1160; see also id. at 1162 n.9 (contrasting the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation 
of the standard in Sony, 464 U.S. at 1161); see In re Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster 
II), 334 F.3d 643, 653 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring a weighing of the probabilities alleged 
for significant noninfringing uses to show that they could actually be used in 
noninfringing ways); see also Miller, supra note 79, at 206 (finding that the Ninth 
Circuit’s reading of Sony differed greatly from the Seventh Circuit’s, focusing on the 
capability for substantial noninfringing uses). 
 122 See Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 653. 
 123 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162 and n.10. 
 124 Id. at 1161–63. 
 125 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 237; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162. 
 126 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163. 
 127 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 237; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163. 
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to retain lists of the infringing files.128  So, even if both were to 
shut down their own computers, users would still be able to 
conduct their illegal activities using the defendants’ software.129  
Therefore, Grokster’s and StreamCast’s relationship with users 
ended when users downloaded the product.130  Thus, the court held 
that there was no way to know of or control the infringements by 
the time the plaintiffs notified the defendants about the infringing 
activity occurring.131  As such, the plaintiffs could not materially 
contribute to the infringing activity, or stop them.  Therefore, 
plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite element of actual 
knowledge. 
To end the contributory infringement inquiry, the Ninth Circuit 
agreed with the district court that Grokster and StreamCast did not 
materially contribute to the infringing activities.132  While Napster 
had the means to know and track the copyrighted material being 
exchanged, the defendants could not, under Fonovisa, provide the 
“site and facilities” for the infringement because of the software’s 
design.133  Thus, plaintiffs could not satisfy the elements of 
knowledge and material contribution and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling on the issue of contributory 
infringement.134 
 
 128 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163 (citing the district court’s finding that even if Grokster 
and StreamCast “closed their doors and deactivated all computers within their control, 
users of their products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption” (quoting 
Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041)). 
 129 Miller, supra note 79, at 207. 
 130 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163 (finding that because no file indices resided on the 
defendants’ computers, they did not have the ability to suspend the user accounts). 
 131 Id. (noting that it is the users of the software who create the network and provide the 
access). 
 132 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 238; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163. 
 133 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163. See supra notes 96–101 for a discussion of the design 
of Grokster and StreamCast. 
 134 Id. at 1163–64 (after agreeing with the district court that defendants do not materially 
contribute to copyright infringement, the contributory infringement claim was 
exhausted). 
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2. Supreme Court Decision 
Instead of resolving the split among the Circuit Courts on 
interpreting Sony,135 the Supreme Court introduced the theory of 
inducement to hold the defendants liable, and vacated the summary 
judgment in favor of Grokster and StreamCast.136  The issue 
decided before the Court was, “under what circumstances [is] the 
distributor of a product capable of both lawful and unlawful 
use . . . liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties 
using the product[.]”137 
Although the Court did not dismiss the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Sony, it held that the Ninth Circuit erred in finding 
that Sony shielded the defendants from contributory 
infringement.138  The Sony defense could not shield defendants 
who were liable for intent to induce infringement.139  Here, the 
Court adopted yet another theory of indirect liability from the 
Patent Act: “inducement to infringe.”140  According to the Court, 
Grokster and StreamCast were liable under this theory and 
“inducement” means “one who distributes a device with the object 
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear 
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, 
is liable” for a third party’s infringement.141 
The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the 
Sony decision when it held that Grokster’s and StreamCast’s 
capability for noninfringing uses precluded liability for 
contributory copyright infringement.142  According to the Court, 
plaintiffs had intended to induce infringement so they were still 
liable for contributory copyright infringement, and the Sony 
defense did not apply.143  The Supreme Court found that the Ninth 
 
 135 See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 
913, 933 (2005) (the parties and many amici asked the Court to clarify the phrase 
“capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses”). 
 136 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 239; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 941–42. 
 137 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 918–19. 
 138 Id. at 933–34. 
 139 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 239; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 933–34. 
 140 Miller, supra note 79, at 211. 
 141 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 919. 
 142 Id. at 933–34. 
 143 Id. at 938–40 (illustrating that Grokster and StreamCast had intent to induce). 
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Circuit “read Sony’s limitation to mean that whenever a product is 
capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can never be held 
contributorily liable for third parties’ infringing use of it . . . .”144  
Improperly, the Ninth Circuit had broadened the scope of Sony to 
protect distributors from any secondary liability theory.145  
However, the Supreme Court held that the court should have 
inquired further once it determined that the device was capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses.146 
To satisfy the element of intent to induce, the Court adopted 
the patent law’s theory of intentional inducement of 
infringement.147  According to this theory, the plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant knowingly aided and abetted another’s direct 
infringement.148  The Court then referenced several patent cases to 
demonstrate what constituted intent.  For example, according to 
Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, evidence of improper purpose would 
suffice, such as the defendant’s advertising or instruction to entice 
or persuade another party to infringe.149  The Court also explained 
what would not be considered an intent to induce infringement.  
For example, in Sony, there was no evidence suggesting defendants 
intended to promote infringing uses of their product.150 Instead, 
defendants only had “mere knowledge” that some users would use 
the products to infringe.151  Thus, the Court concluded that there 
must be evidence of “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct” 
to be held liable for intent to induce.152 
 
 144 Id. at 934. 
 145 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934 (stating that the 
Ninth Circuit reading was in error because “Sony did not displace other theories of 
secondary liability”). 
 146 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 933–36 (continuing with the inducement theory after 
dismissing the Ninth’s Circuit’s reading). 
 147 See id. at 934–36. 
 148 Id. at 936. (citing Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (C.A. 
Fed. 1988) (liability for inducement where one “actively and knowingly aid[s] and 
abet[s] another’s direct infringement” (emphasis omitted))). 
 149 Id. (citing Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 412–13 (C.A.5 1963) 
(demonstrations by sales staff of infringing uses for a patented device supported liability 
for inducement)); Coats et al., supra note 14, at 240. 
 150 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 936 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 240 (quoting Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 937). 
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Evidence of Grokster’s and StreamCast’s intent to induce 
included three main factors.153  First, Grokster and StreamCast 
courted Napster users.  Some of their courting included making 
initial versions of their software compatible with Napster’s 
software, advertising to former Napster users,154 and Grokster had 
also attempted to direct web searches for Napster to its own site.155  
Second, neither Grokster nor StreamCast attempted to develop 
filtering tools to diminish infringement.156  Third, both services 
indirectly benefited financially from the infringement; their 
business model provided that advertising revenue would increase 
with the increase of traffic on the website, which was mostly the 
result of infringing use.157  The Court noted that neither the second 
nor the third factor alone would satisfy the inducement inquiry, but 
because the defendants took active steps to induce infringement, 
the last two factors strengthened the showing of improper intent.158  
The defendants’ evidence therefore satisfied the intent to induce 
inquiry for purposes of summary judgment.159 
The Court held that Grokster and StreamCast were not 
protected from liability by the Sony decision because the evidence 
of improper intent overcame the fact that their products had both 
infringing and noninfringing capabilities.160  This demonstrates 
that the Court focused on the technology providers’ intent and 
condemned their bad conduct, rather than attacking the technology 
itself.161  Unlike Sony, where the primary purpose of the Betamax 
was time-shifting, or fair use,162 the Court found that the main 
functions of the services at issue were to assist in the infringing 
 
 153 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 240–41; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 939–40. 
 154 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 241; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 939. 
 155 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 939; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 241. 
 156 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 939; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 241. 
 157 Kramer, supra note 73, at 180; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 939–40. 
 158 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 241; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 939–40 & n.12. 
 159 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 941. 
 160 Id. (distinguishing Sony because Sony’s liability was “based solely on distributing a 
product with [both] lawful and unlawful uses, with knowledge that some users would 
follow the unlawful course,” whereas Grokster’s “words and deeds” went beyond 
distribution). 
 161 Kramer, supra note 73, at 182. 
 162 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 943 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447–55, 774 (1984)). 
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activity.163  The copyright owners submitted abundant evidence of 
statements and actions to demonstrate intent to facilitate 
infringement.164  Therefore, if an alleged secondary infringer acted 
with an improper intent, it would not be shielded by Sony.165  After 
determining Grokster’s and StreamCast’s liability, the Court 
declined the plaintiffs’ invitation to further substantiate the 
“capable of substantial noninfringing uses” standard in Sony.166  
However, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer provided some 
guidance in its interpretation in their concurring opinions.167 
C. Congress’ Role in the Grokster III Case 
While the Grokster case was being decided in the courts, 
Congress was considering enacting a bill to directly address the 
P2P problem, the “Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act 2004” 
(“Induce Act”).168  Introduced in June 2004, after the district court 
ruled in Grokster I but before the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, the bill was discussed in the U.S. Senate for the next 
year.169  Both lobbyist and senator sponsors were enraged that the 
district court had given Grokster and StreamCast Sony immunity, 
so they pushed for this bill to target companies that made and 
distributed file-sharing software.170  Effectively, the Induce Act 
would add a new cause of action under the copyright statute, 
 
 163 Id. at 941 (majority opinion). 
 164 See id. at 922–27; see also Miller, supra note 79, at 211–12. 
 165 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 935 (stating that, “where 
evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to 
infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement, 
Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability”). 
 166 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934. 
 167 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 942–65. 
 168 See S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004) (as introduced, June 22, 2004). 
 169 See Protecting Copyright and Innovation in a Post-Grokster World: Hearing Before 
the Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Marybeth Peters, 
Register of Copyrights) [hereinafter Protecting Copyright and Innovation Hearing] 
(stating that there were no parties advocating a resumption of discussions on the Induce 
Act after the Court ruled in Grokster), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat 
092805.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2007). 
 170 See, e.g., Grant Gross, Bill Targets Firms That ‘Induce’ Copyright Violations, 
MACWORLD, July 6, 2004, http://www.macworld.com/news/2004/07/06/induce (quoting 
Senator sponsor Orin Hatch on the Induce Bill: “It is illegal and immoral to induce or 
encourage children to commit crimes”). 
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allowing a copyright owner to sue anyone who “intentionally aids, 
abets, induces, or procures” a third-party to commit 
infringement.171  Intent would be inferred from “all relevant 
information” that is “reasonably available to the alleged inducer, 
including whether the [inducer’s] activity relies on infringement 
for its commercial viability.”172  Any inducer found liable under 
the Act would be subject to all the remedies provided for copyright 
infringement.173 
Like the plaintiffs in Grokster, this bill focused on the current 
“primary purpose” of the technology.174  This required 
examination of both the probability of alleged potential uses and 
existing uses to determine whether or not a product or service was 
intended to be used primarily to infringe.175  However, one can 
draw from the Sony example to see how this is problematic.  If this 
bill were enacted twenty-two years ago, the VTR would be 
obsolete.176  Evidence that Sony actively encouraged infringement 
would be determined by its primary uses and any probable 
capabilities at the time.177  According to Justice Breyer in Grokster 
 
 171 S. 2560, 108th Cong. § 2 (as introduced June 22, 2004); Steve Seidenberg, Congress 
Might Run Roughshod Over Sony Ruling, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 2004, at 6. 
 172 S. 2560, 108th Cong. § 2 (as introduced June 22, 2004); Seidenberg, supra note 171, 
at 6. 
 173 Seidenberg, supra note 171, at 6. 
 174 Cf. Reply Brief For Motion Picture Studio and Recording Co. Petitioners at 8, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., No. 04-480 (U.S. March 18, 2005) 
(stating that “a defendant should be liable whenever infringement is the principal or 
primary use”).  The Induce Act would require looking at all relevant available evidence 
to determine whether or not an alleged inducer is inducing users to infringe.  Both the 
Induce Act and the plaintiffs in Grokster thus wanted to weigh the probability of all 
alleged potential noninfringing uses against infringing uses.  For the Induce Act, this 
would determine the alleged inducer’s “intent,” and for the plaintiffs in Grokster, this 
would determine the “primary purpose” of the product or service. Id. 
 175 Id. (defining primary use: “[w]here the primary use is infringement, the defendant is 
fairly said to be in the business of infringement, not ‘substantially unrelated’ 
commerce”). 
 176 See Kramer, supra note 73, at 173. 
 177 See id.  However, it is worth noting that analog media, like the videocassettes VTR’s 
used, degrade with every copy and cannot survive in the long run.  Digital pirating of 
music and video clips, on the other hand, is as good as the original copy.  So, while the 
production of the VTR set the stage for a video rental market, digital pirating precludes, 
and has substantially reduced, the market for purchasing physical copies of music and 
video clips.  But this is not to say that a viable market for purchasing digital copies does 
not exist.  iTunes and Napster have been extremely successful in the combat against 
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III, ninety-one percent of the VTRs’ uses were unauthorized, so 
Sony would have been enjoined from manufacturing any more of 
them.178  Moreover, had this been the rule of law then, unforeseen 
noninfringing uses, like the video rental market, would be 
precluded even before they were thought up.179  Thus, the Induce 
Act would effectively remove from the “substantial noninfringing 
uses” inquiry, the unforeseen noninfringing uses a product may be 
capable of; these potential uses could not be used to weigh with 
current noninfringing uses against current infringing uses in 
determining whether the product should be given protection under 
Sony.180 
After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Grokster III was 
announced, discussions over the bill did not resume.181  Some 
believed that the inducement theory was the Court’s own version 
of the Induce Act, accommodating products capable of 
“commercially significant noninfringing uses”182 and products 
capable of potential noninfringing uses.183  However, like the 
Induce Act, the inducement theory adopted by the Court may limit 
the significance of the Sony protection.  One of the primary 
differences between the Induce Act and the inducement theory is 
that the Induce Act would limit the Sony inquiry to “commercially 
 
digital piracy.  Thus, the Sony test is still applied the same way for videocassettes and 
digital copying.  But their effects on the market for physical copies were extremely 
different in both cases. Id. 
 178 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913,  
950–51 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (determining that approximately nine percent of 
the VTR’s uses were authorized). 
 179 See id. at 954–55 (Breyer, J., concurring) (reasoning that there may be unforeseen 
noninfringing uses of P2P software that may develop later, like the video rental market 
after the VTR was determined to have noninfringing uses). 
 180 See, e.g., Seidenberg, supra note 171, at col. 1 (finding that under the Induce Act, 
Sony would not have been liable as a contributory infringer, but would have been found 
guilty of inducing infringement.  That would lead to the injunction against any further 
sale of VTRs). 
 181 See Protecting Copyright and Innovation Hearing, supra note 169. 
 182 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 183 See Protecting Copyright and Innovation Hearing, supra note 169. (stating that 
“[t]he Court’s ruling struck an appropriate balance between the rights of copyright 
holders and the flexibility necessary to enable and encourage technologists to continue to 
develop new products”); see also, Kramer supra note 73 at 177–78 (copyright holders 
would want a test for “commercially significant noninfringing uses” while technologists 
would want a test for “capable of substantial noninfringing uses”). 
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significant noninfringing” uses, whereas the inducement theory 
may halt the Sony inquiry altogether, if read inappropriately.184  
The factors used to hold Grokster and StreamCast liable were seen 
as a way to balance the worries of both the critics and proponents 
of the Induce Act.185  They were meant to clearly illustrate the 
intent to induce, but because the theory is new, it is not clear how 
those factors would be applied to other products capable of both 
infringing and noninfringing uses.186  Another important difference 
is that, according to the Court, evidence that the product could 
have been designed differently would not be nearly as probative 
without other evidence of clear, affirmative steps to induce.187  Had 
the Court not imposed this limitation on the intent to induce, many 
technologies would potentially be susceptible to the theory, since it 
could be alleged that they could have been designed in another 
way to prevent infringing uses.188  Also, the lack of filters could be 
used as evidence that the producers intended to induce 
infringement.  Such evidence would probably weigh heavily 
against evidence of commercially significant noninfringing uses, 
especially in the case of the Apple TV. 
The Apple TV enables digital content, such as digital music 
clips and video clips, to be streamed from any computer running 
Mac OS X or Microsoft Windows onto an enhanced-definition or 
high-definition widescreen television.189  In a way, it acts like 
Grokster and StreamCast because it does not store the digital 
 
 184 See Kramer, supra note 73 at 181–82 (for a discussion of the Court’s conflicting 
interpretations of the Sony defense).  For a discussion on the Court’s inducement theory, 
see infra Part IV. 
 185 See Protecting Copyright and Innovation Hearing, supra note 169 (discussing the 
balancing of rights of the opposing parties). 
 186 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 940 
(2005) (stating that, “[Grokster’s] unlawful objective is unmistakable”); see also id. at 
936 n.11 (stating that, “[i]nducement has been codified in patent law.”  This shows that 
the theory did not exist in copyright law before this case). 
 187 See id. at 939 n.12. 
 188 See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1 (determining that it was crucial that the Court 
did not hold that a company could be liable strictly because the product could have been 
designed differently.  Products like the iPod could have been found to have been 
designed differently and therefore liable). 
 189 Wikipedia.org, Apple TV, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_TV (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2007). 
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content itself.190  Instead, like other STBs, it converts the digital 
content found on up to five nearby computers into analogue 
pictures and sounds;191 that is, into the information one watches or 
hears on his or her television set.  Thus, like the defendants in 
Grokster III, Apple supplies copyright infringers with the unit they 
need to further infringe copyrights.  So if Apple advertised “Rip, 
Mix, Burn” to potential Apple TV users, like it did to its iPod 
users, should it be held liable for inducing infringement? 
Although Grokster III was sufficient to preclude a primary 
purpose rule, it could also preclude the development of products 
like the Apple TV.192  The Court’s opinion in Grokster III raises 
the issue of whether inducement is a new theory of liability under 
copyright law or an extension of contributory infringement.193  The 
majority opinion seems to indicate that inducement is an element 
of contributory infringement194 but the theory may be viewed as a 
new theory of liability because it draws from patent law cases to 
define intent to induce.195  The Court stated that it was adopting the 
rule from patent law just as it adopted the “staple article of 
commerce doctrine” in Sony, and under patent law, inducement 
and contributory infringement are separate causes of action.196  
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to think the Court is creating a 
new theory for secondary liability in copyright law.197  Moreover, 
the Court refused to further clarify the inducement standard’s 
relationship to Sony after it found defendants liable under the 
 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 934 
(2005) (declining requests to revisit Sony); Chander & Sunder, supra note 1 (stating that 
the Court did not adopt the “principal use” test). 
 193 Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242. 
 194 See id.; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 930 (stating that, “[o]ne infringes contributorily by 
intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement”). 
 195 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 935 (referencing patent law cases to illustrate intent to 
induce). 
 196 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (inducement), with § 271(c) (contributory); see also 
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242–43. 
 197 Compare Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 935 (stating that the Sony analysis reflected patent 
law’s traditional article of commerce doctrine), with id. at 936 & n.11 (stating the rule of 
inducement was developed in early cases and then references patent cases.  It also says 
that inducement was codified in patent law); Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242–43. 
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theory,198 so we do not know whether it was a separate cause of 
action defendants were held potentially liable under, or a rebuttal 
to the Sony defense. 
If the inducement theory is a new cause of action and plaintiffs 
have evidence against manufacturers and distributors similar to the 
evidence that implicated Grokster and StreamCast, it seems 
reasonable for copyright holders to try and find defendants liable 
under this theory before going through the traditional contributory 
infringement theory.199  Holding defendants liable under a new 
cause of action preempts defendants from using the Sony 
defense.200  However, reading the new inducement theory in this 
way creates liability for new technologies worthy of the Sony 
defense, whether they have commercially significant noninfringing 
uses or the capability for substantial noninfringing uses.  Although 
any staple article of commerce can be used to illustrate this point, 
the Apple TV will be used because it is one of the newest products 
of digital technology today. 
III. POST-GROKSTER III WORLD: HOW DO COURTS NOW HOLD 
MANUFACTURERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF PRODUCTS  
CAPABLE OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABLE? 
A. The Apple TV Illustrates How Grokster III Should Not Be Read 
A “fake complaint” was brought by the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (“EFF”) when the Induce Act was being considered by 
Congress.201  It was meant to show how the Induce Act could be 
used to hold Apple responsible for secondary liability if it were 
implemented.202  However, drawing from some of the arguments in 
this complaint may show that Apple could also be held liable for 
 
 198 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934. 
 199 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 935 (stating, “Sony’s staple-article rule will not 
preclude [intent to induce] liability”); Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242–43. 
 200 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934–35 (holding that protection under Sony from 
traditional contributory infringement will not preclude a finding of intent to induce). 
 201 See generally Cindy A. Cohn & Jason M. Schultz, Prelude to a Fake Complaint, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., June 24, 2004, http://www.eff.org/IP/Apple_Complaint.php. 
 202 See id. (“If this bill had been law in 2000, there would be no iPod.”). 
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contributory infringement with the Apple TV under the 
Grokster III decision, if the decision is not read properly. 
If one applies the main factors used to hold Grokster and 
StreamCast liable under the inducement theory before considering 
the Sony defense or traditional contributory liability, it is possible 
that Apple will be held liable for Grokster-like behavior.  Recall 
that Grokster and StreamCast courted copyright infringing users, 
refused to develop filtering tools and indirectly derived revenue 
from the high volume of infringing uses.203  Also, recall that the 
Supreme Court expressly stated that the last two factors standing 
alone would not be enough to give rise to liability.204  In applying 
the first factor, one might argue that Apple courted copyright 
infringing users.  Apple advertised to its iPod customers that they 
could “Rip, Mix, and Burn” their music or videos.205  For iPods, 
this meant taking music or videos users had on their hard drive, 
mixing the tracks onto a playlist, and burning them onto the 
iPod.206  This clearly satisfies the elements of direct copyright 
infringement.207  Moreover, the iPod’s wide success as the most 
popular MP3-player on the market can be at least attributed to the 
copyright infringers’ exposure to advertising.208  Based on the 
iPods’ success in facilitating unauthorized downloads of 
copyrighted musical works, it crossed the digital music clip world 
and entered the digital video clip world, first with the Video iPod, 
and now with the Apple TV.209  Although, at the time of this note, 
statistics for the success of the Apple TV are unavailable, it has the 
potential to play anything the iPod can play on a much larger 
scale.210  Because the Apple TV acts only as a medium and not a 
storage device, it can receive and send countless numbers of digital 
 
 203 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 938–40. 
 204 Id. at 939–41 & n.12. 
 205 See Bowrey, supra note 7; Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201. 
 206 See Bowrey, supra note 7. 
 207 See Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201. 
 208 See Lev Grossman, How Apple Does It, TIME, Oct. 24, 2005, at 66, 70; Bowrey, 
supra note 7 (citing LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 9 (Random House 2001)). 
 209 See Lev Grossman, supra note 208, at 66, 70; Richard Siklos, Cool, a Video iPod.  
Want to Watch ‘Lost’?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005. 
 210 See Peter Cohen, Apple ‘It’s Showtime!’ Event—Live Coverage, MACWORLD, 
Sept. 12, 2006, at http://macworld.com/news/2006/09/12/showtime/index.php?pf=1. 
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music and video clips to one’s television.211  While Apple 
programmed the Apple TV so that it could only play music or 
videos downloaded from Apple's iTunes, within days of its release 
in March 2007, hackers were able to easily break into the Apple 
TV operating system and program the Apple TV to transmit digital 
media they had on their hard drive.212  These hackers even left 
instructions for other Apple TV purchasers to do the same.213  This 
weak attempt to install filters shows that Apple made it too easy 
for hackers to reprogram the Apple TV.214  Apple did not and 
cannot reasonably expect Apple TV users to spend thousands of 
dollars to transfer only legal downloads after spending $299 on the 
Apple TV itself.215  According to Grokster III, and the supplied 
patent law cases, the product’s capability to transmit endless 
amounts of illegal downloads, coupled with its advertisement 
 
 211 Wikipedia.org, Apple TV, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_TV (last visited Mar. 
28, 2007). 
 212 John P. Falcone, Review: Apple TV Best for iTunes Addicts, CNN.COM, Mar. 27, 
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/ptech/03/27/apple.tv/index.html (discussing 
Apple TV’s capability to only play iTunes media).  The Apple TV was officially released 
on March 21, 2007, and within 10 days of its release, hackers were able to play non-
iTunes media. See Electronista.com, Apple TV Hack Boots Full Mac OS X, Mar. 31, 
2007, http://www.electronista.com/articles/07/03/31/apple.tv.full.mac.os.x/; The 
Something Awful Forums, We Just Got Xvid Working on the Apple TV, http://forums. 
somethingawful.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=2391956; AppleTVHacks.net, Apple 
TV Running on a Macbook, Mar. 27, 2007, http://www.appletvhacks.net/2007/03/27/ 
apple-tv-running-on-a-macbook/; AppleTVHacks.net, Booting the Apple TV from a USB 
Drive, Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.appletvhacks.net/2007/03/26/booting-the-apple-tv-
from-a-usb-drive/.  It is worthy to note that as of the writing of this note in April 2007, it 
is mostly savvy hackers that can reprogram the Apple TV to play digital content on their 
hard drives, but the more hackers keep working on reprogramming Apple TV’s operating 
system to play non-iTunes media, and re-writing parts of its operating system, the more 
the hackers’ programming instructions become easier to implement.  Hence, instructions 
for reprogramming the Apple TV will probably eventually be easy enough for any 
layperson to do it, also. See Engadget.com, How-To: Play DivX and Xvid on Your Apple 
TV, Apr. 10, 2007, http://www.engadget.com/2007/04/10/how-to-play-divx-and-xvid-on-
your-apple-tv (finding that earlier hacks were less practical for most people who were not 
proficient at computer programming, and then giving newer and easier instructions for re-
programming the Apple TV to play non-iTunes media). 
 213 Electronista.com: Apple TV Hack, supra note 212; Something Awful, supra note 
212; AppleTVHacks.net: Apple TV/Macbook, supra note 212; AppleTVHacks.net: Apple 
TV/USB, supra note 212. 
 214 Something Awful, supra note 212 (poster discussing her surprise that Apple did not 
put more protection in the Apple TV to prevent hackers from reprogramming it). 
 215 See Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201. 
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campaign, are clear expressions of steps taken by Apple to 
encourage infringement.216 
With respect to the second factor, Apple refused to adequately 
engineer an interactive media product that was not capable of 
playing music or video clips in the MP3 format illegal P2P file-
sharing services used.217  Apple designed the Apple TV to only use 
iTunes, yet hackers were easily able to re-program it to play other 
digital files soon after it was released.  Apple could have designed 
the Apple TV with better code encryption.218  While it may not 
prevent hackers from eventually figuring out how to re-write the 
instructions for the Apple TV to play non-iTunes media, it 
probably would have slowed them down, taking longer than ten 
days to reprogram it.219  However, Apple chose not to design the 
iPod or the Apple TV in a more effective way because playing 
only authorized and protected files  would be far less popular on 
the market and therefore less commercially viable.220  This is 
evidenced by Sony’s Networked Walkman,  and its own 
experience with its advanced audio coding (“AAC”) format.221  
The iPod’s ability to play unprotected MP3 files was used to attract 
infringing users and increase its commercial value.222  Knowing 
the Apple TV’s high probability for transmitting copyright 
infringing files and learning from the commercial success of iPods, 
Apple chose not to make the Apple TV in a way that would not let 
 
 216 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 
934 (2005) (“contributory liability for patent infringement may be found where a good’s 
‘most conspicuous use is one which will co-operate in an infringement when sale to such 
user is invoked by advertisement’ of the infringing use”) (citing Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 
224 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1912)); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. R. Specialty Co., 
75 F. 1005, 1007–08 (2d Cir. 1896) (“relying on advertisements and displays to find 
defendant’s ‘willingness . . . to aid other persons in any attempts which they may be 
disposed to make towards [patent] infringement’”); see also Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 940 
n.13 (“Inducement liability goes beyond [encouraging], and the distribution of a product 
can itself give rise to liability where evidence shows that the distributor intended and 
encouraged the product to be used to infringe”). 
 217 See Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201. 
 218 Something Awful, supra note 212. 
 219 See Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201. 
 220 Something Awful, supra note 212 (poster opines that Apple probably wanted the 
Apple TV to be hacked into). 
 221 See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1; see also Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201. 
 222 See Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201. 
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copyright infringing users infringe.  Thus, Apple encourages these 
users to increase the amount of infringement they perpetuate.223 
Lastly, Apple derives a large portion of its revenue from the 
high volume of infringing uses.  Apple has just begun selling the 
Apple TV, so there are not enough sales figures to determine its 
success as of yet.224  But one can look to the success of all the 
iPods Apple sold in the 2006 fiscal year to gauge Apple’s financial 
benefit from exploiting illegal P2P file-sharing.225  These devices 
accounted for forty percent of Apple’s 4.36 billion dollars in total 
sales by the end of the quarter.226  It also has an estimated seventy 
percent of the U.S. market in MP3 players.227  These figures 
indicate that a substantial portion of Apple’s revenue is derived 
from iPods.  Furthermore, most of the music stored on iPods are 
not legal, but illegal downloads.  From October 2005 to September 
2006 (the end of Apple’s fiscal year), Apple sold about 
130,000,000 songs on iTunes228 and 39,409,000 iPods.229  
Plugging these figures into the equation developed by an amicus 
brief in Grokster III, the average iPod holds about three songs 
bought from iTunes.230  Apple indeed financially benefits from 
infringing uses of its product.  With this knowledge, Apple intends 
to do the same on a much larger scale with the Apple TV. 
 
 223 See id. 
 224 Wikipedia.org, Apple TV, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_TV (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2007). 
 225 Steve Dowling, Apple Reports Second Quarter Results, APPLE, Apr. 19, 2006, 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2006/apr/19results.html; see also Suzanne Vranica, 
Marketers Aim New Ads at Apple video Users, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2006, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113867199829460498.html (stating that “Apple doesn’t 
release sales figures for the video iPod”). 
 226 See Dowling, supra note 225. 
 227 See Nick Wingfield, Keeping iPod Humming Along, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Jul. 15, 
2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115291714677107410.html (stating that the iPod’s 
share in the U.S. MP3 market is more than seventy percent). 
 228 Liz Einbinder, iTunes Music Store Downloads Top 50 Million Songs, Mar. 15, 2004, 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2004/mar/15itunes.html (discussing iTunes users as 
downloading 2.5 million songs per week and an annual run rate of 130 million songs per 
year). 
 229 Wikipedia.org. iPod sales graph, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Ipod_sales.svg. 
 230 See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1 (providing the calculation for Apple iPods sold 
from amicus brief). We cannot take the number of videos sold into consideration since 
not all iPods are capable of holding videos. 
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It is important to note that the Grokster III Court held that, 
without evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find 
contributory infringement liability if the only evidence of 
inducement was that a product capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses could have been designed differently to bar copyright 
infringement.231  With evidence of active steps to induce, the fact 
that the software could have been designed differently would 
heighten and further substantiate a contributory infringement 
claim.232  Arguably, Apple took those affirmative steps to induce 
by distributing a product intended for infringing use and also 
advertising that use.233  In light of this evidence, the design of the 
software further infers a contributory infringement claim. 
If a court finds Apple liable under the inducement theory 
without first considering the traditional contributory liability 
theory, Apple cannot use the fact that the Apple TV is capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses as a defense.  With respect to 
contributory infringement, the Court makes it clear that the Sony 
defense will not protect a defendant from liability when the 
plaintiff has evidence of wrongful intent.234  Since there is 
evidence of intent to induce here, Apple may be held liable without 
a Sony defense to shield it. 
B. The Correct Post-Grokster III World:  
Reconciliation of Sony and Grokster III 
1. The Importance of the Traditional Contributory  
Liability Inquiry 
The Supreme Court intended the Grokster III holding to be 
read as a rebuttal to the Sony defense under the theory of 
contributory liability.  As shown above, finding a defendant liable 
under Grokster III without an inquiry into traditional contributory 
 
 231 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 938 
n.12 (2005). 
 232 See id. at 939. 
233 Fromberg, 315 F.2d at 412–13 (finding advertising to entice another to infringe may 
constitute inducement). 
 234 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934–35 (referencing the inducement theory and stating that, 
“Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability”). 
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infringement could preclude the development of any product 
capable of both infringing and noninfringing uses, as long as it 
promotes a use capable of being deemed infringing.235  But, the 
Grokster III Court clearly intended to maintain the Sony defense, 
as it expressly stated that it wanted to protect technologies capable 
of disseminating information widely and rapidly, like the iPod.236  
Determining the liability of these producers of information 
technology, though, does not require revisiting Sony, but rather a 
proper reading of Grokster III.237  Grokster III must be read as a 
limit on the Sony defense, no matter how Sony is defined.  To give 
copyright owners and innovators a new theory of liability without 
giving them proper boundaries on how it should be applied would 
probably strike the wrong balance between innovation and 
dissemination.238 
The traditional contributory infringement test is an important 
prelude to testing for contributory liability under the inducement 
theory.239  It prevents evidence of constructive knowledge from 
being used as evidence of “clear expression” or “affirmative steps 
to foster infringement.”240  The patent cases the Court uses as 
examples to meet this standard are insufficient because it is not 
immediately apparent how they are applicable in a copyright 
context.241  In fact, liability for inducement to infringe under the 
Patent Act has been unclear in patent cases.  There has been a split 
in the circuit courts for a decade between competing patent cases.  
 
 235 See supra Part III. 
 236 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that Sony shelters MP3 
players); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913, 
(No. 04-480) (questioning plaintiffs’ proposed test for a “majority use [that is] 
noninfringing.”  Justice Breyer argues that it presents problems for the iPod inventor who 
cannot gauge its unforeseen uses before he has invented it). 
 237 Kramer, supra note 73, at 185 (stating that the failure to clarify the scope of the 
Grokster holding will create some controversy in the courts, which may affect technology 
communities). 
 238 Id. (citing Brief in Support of Issuance of Writ of Certiorari by Amici Curiae Law 
Professors at 7, Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913 (No. 04-480)). 
 239 Compare Coats et al., supra note 14, at 243 (stating that inducement and contributory 
infringement are separate theories under patent law), with Chander & Sunder, supra 
note 1. 
 240 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 919. 
 241 See, e.g., Coats et al., supra note 14, at 243 (stating that inducement and contributory 
infringement are separate theories under patent law). 
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Some circuit courts focus on patent cases imposing a broader scope 
of liability for infringement because of a weaker intent standard, 
while other circuit courts focus on patent cases imposing a 
narrower scope of liability because of a stronger intent standard.242  
The traditional contributory infringement test, however, provides a 
sufficient background to make the inducement theory applicable to 
copyright law.243  Indeed, “intent to induce” is supposed to be a 
high standard since the providers’ actions must be affirmative, and 
not merely passive or ambiguous.244  Going through the traditional 
contributory infringement test first assures that these steps are 
clearly affirmative and allows the courts to differentiate between 
evidence of intent, actual knowledge, constructive knowledge and 
mere knowledge. 
2. The Apple TV Illustrates How Grokster III Must Be Read 
Understanding that the inducement theory is a rebuttal to the 
Sony defense, plaintiffs would initially bring a case for 
contributory infringement against defendants in its traditional 
form.  Defendants would assert the Sony defense and the court 
would consider that defense first.245  While the Court’s majority 
opinion in Grokster III does not give any indication of how Sony 
should be applied, one may look to the concurring decisions in 
Grokster III to determine whether or not the Sony protection 
applies to the Apple TV.246  As illustrated by Sony and the circuit 
 
 242 Oswald, supra note 25, at 226. 
 243 Compare Coats et al., supra note 14, at 243 (stating that inducement and contributory 
infringement are separate theories under patent law), with Chander & Sunder, supra note 1. 
 244 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 937 (stating that “[t]he inducement rule . . . premises 
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct”). 
 245 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II), 380 F.3d 1154, 
1160 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’g, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 
259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), rev’d by, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig. 
(Aimster II), 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 
(Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 246 See generally Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 914–15 (clarifying the “capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses” rule). 
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courts, determining the level of knowledge is important to a 
finding of contributory liability.247 
Under both concurring opinions, the Apple TV would be 
entitled to the Sony protection.  Like the VTR, the Apple TV is 
capable of noninfringing uses, such as what could be described as, 
“place-shifting.” 248  Place-shifting means downloading music or 
video clips from a legal source—for example, a purchased CD or 
iTunes—onto one’s hard drive, and using the Apple TV to place 
that digital content on the television screen.249  Though, like the 
VTR, the Apple TV could be used for infringing purposes, such as 
transferring unauthorized copies of music and movies and loading 
them onto one’s TV.250  As will be shown below, even if Apple 
knew that many buyers would use the Apple TV for transferring 
unauthorized copyrighted work, it would still be insufficient to 
 
 247 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) 
(stating that, “[i]f vicarious liability is to be imposed on [petitioners] in this case, it must 
rest on the fact that they have sold equipment with constructive knowledge . . . . There is 
no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a 
theory.”); see also Grokster II, 380 F.3d 1154; Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643; Napster II, 
239 F.3d 1004. 
 248 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (stating that “one potential use of the Betamax plainly 
satisfies [the capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses] standard . . . 
private, noncommercial time-shifting . . .”); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond 
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (1999) (defining “space-shifting” as taking 
one’s legally owned music or audiovisual recording and putting it on another device for 
personal use).  In this case, the Ninth Circuit extended the doctrine of Sony to space-
shifting.  The court ruled that this was legitimate and constituted substantial 
noninfringing use.  This decision paved the way for other companies, like Apple, to enter 
the MP3 player market.  See Lauren Elizabeth, Contributory Infringement, EVERYTHING2, 
Dec. 9, 2005, http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=1768993.  However, at least in 
Apple iPod’s case, most of the files contained in the average iPod is not legal and 
whether or not that portion of legal files actually constitute a “substantial noninfringing 
use” has not been determined or affirmed by the Supreme Court.  See Chander & Sunder, 
supra note 1.  That is why defining “substantial noninfringing uses” is the single most 
important question technology innovators want answered. See Grokster III, 545 U.S. 
at 934 (rejecting the request of parties and amici to revisit Sony). 
 249 Recording Indus. Ass’n. of Am., 180 F.3d at 1079.  Note that space-shifting is the 
legal term for “Rip, Mix, Burn.”  The combination of “rip,” “mix” and “burn” is derived 
from internet lingo that could also mean “ripping” off unauthorized copies of copyrighted 
work. See Bowrey, supra note 7. 
 250 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 423–24; Chander & Sunder, supra note 1.  As users “shift” 
music and video clips from one device onto another (convenient) device, users would 
also “shift” their music and video clips from one room to another room. 
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hold Apple contributorily liable because its noninfringing uses 
would be deemed significant under both readings of Sony.251 
Justice Ginsburg argues in her concurring opinion that the 
defendants’ software in Grokster III did not meet the Sony 
standard.252  She focuses on the “commercially significant 
noninfringing uses” passage of Sony and argues that Grokster’s 
evidence of noninfringing uses do not give rise to a reasonable 
belief that those uses would become substantial in the future.253  
While Sony offered evidence that the VTR’s substantial 
noninfringing uses had reasonable prospects for developing,254 
Grokster’s or StreamCast’s evidence of noninfringing uses was 
anecdotal and could not outweigh the evidence offered by 
plaintiffs that Grokster and StreamCast were overwhelmingly used 
for infringement.255  As opposed to Grokster and StreamCast’s 
evidence, though, Apple’s evidence of noninfringing uses—legal 
digital file-downloading (and then transferring)—is commercially 
viable, as is evidenced by iTunes’ success, especially since more 
video distributors are jumping on board iTunes.256 
Under Justice Breyer’s reading of Sony, the iPods’ capability 
for “commercially significant noninfringing uses” and “substantial 
noninfringing uses” are both important.257  He takes both into 
consideration because Sony used the word “capable” for the 
general inquiry into whether a product was “capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses” in the future, and it also used the word 
“commercial” to qualify the legal inquiry that needed to be 
satisfied by the VTR.258  Applying this rationale to the Apple TV, 
 
 251 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 949–50 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 252 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 948 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. at 943. 
 255 Id. at 946. 
 256 See, e.g., Apple.com, 1 Billion Songs, Jan. 10, 2006, http://www.apple.com/uk/ 
itunes/1billion/ (stating that the one billion songs sold since iTunes opened is a major 
force against piracy, and that iTunes is the most popular video download store). 
 257 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 955 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that, “the 
foreseeable development of such uses, when taken together with an estimated 
[unforeseen] 10% non-infringing material, is sufficient to meet Sony’s standard”). 
 258 Id. at 948 (stating that the Sony Court wrote that a product “need merely be capable 
of substantial non-infringing uses,” (emphasis omitted) but that the legal question in 
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actual evidence exists to show that its noninfringing uses are 
commercially viable.259  Moreover, with Apple’s interactive media 
products constantly expanding—from its first portable player’s 
capacity to hold digital music, to a player capable of holding 
pictures, and then videos, and now Apple TV—there is nothing to 
indicate that more similar noninfringing uses of the product will 
not continue as a consequence of its character.260 
Continuing with the Ninth Circuit’s reading of contributory 
infringement, the Apple TV will still be protected under Sony.261  
Once it is determined that the product is capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses, plaintiffs must prove that Apple had actual 
knowledge of specific acts of infringement to be held liable for 
contributory infringement.262  The strongest evidence against 
Apple showing intent to induce is its capability to transfer large 
amounts of digital music and video clips, which are both 
authorized and unauthorized, and its original advertisement to 
“Rip, Mix, Burn.”263  While other evidence could be used to show 
actual knowledge for another producer’s alleged contributory 
infringement, this is the strongest evidence against Apple that 
could be used to test its actual knowledge.  However, at most, its 
advertisement campaign and Apple TV’s capacity to transfer large 
 
Sony’s particular case was, “whether [Sony’s VTR] is capable of commercially 
significant noninfringing uses”) (alteration in original). 
 259 See, e.g., 1 Billion Songs, supra note 256. 
 260 See Grossman-Cupertino, supra note 208 (inquiring into what Apple would come up 
with in 2006); see also Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 955.  Justice Breyer also argued that the 
ten percent of authorized sharing done on Grokster and StreamCast was comparable to 
the amount of authorized use that the Court found to be significant in Sony, which was 
about nine percent.  If we take the calculated figures for authorized use above, authorized 
music uses in an iPod amount to about 0.03 percent. See supra notes 228–229.  Their 
capacity for noninfringing uses is nonetheless commercially significant.  And their 
potential for unforeseen non-infringing uses is also viable.  Thus, Justice Breyer would 
agree that it should be entitled to the Sony defense. 
 261 Note that, even if in practice, courts would consider the inducement theory before 
applying the traditional contributory infringement test, the traditional test would 
eventually be applied and it would still differentiate between the different types of 
knowledge and liabilities. 
 262 See A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 263 See supra notes 231–232 (finding under patent law cases cited in Grokster III, this 
could constitute inducement). 
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amounts of digital content would show that Apple had constructive 
knowledge of the infringement.264  Unlike Napster and Grokster, 
Apple does not have any direct involvement in the infringing 
activity based on this evidence.265  It does not maintain any 
significant relationship with its customers and its advertisement is 
not a set of directions on how to obtain unauthorized copies of 
digital files.266  In fact, like the defendants in Sony, Apple may 
only have had mere knowledge of actual infringing uses.267  Mere 
knowledge exists when a defendant distributes a product knowing 
it can be used to infringe without having any involvement with the 
infringement occurring, and it is highly arguable that Apple did 
this.268  Evidence that Apple tried to prevent copyright 
infringement by designing it only to play digital clips bought on 
iTunes at most shows that Apple had mere knowledge that the 
product could be used to infringe, but does not show that it 
encouraged direct infringement. 
If one also extends the knowledge inquiry and applies the 
Ninth Circuit timing test in Grokster III, Apple did not have actual 
knowledge at a time when it could prevent the infringing conduct 
because its relationship with its customers ended after they 
purchased the product.269  This is also why Apple could not have 
 
 264 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020 n.5 (determining that evidence of constructive 
knowledge included Napster’s promotion of the site with advertisements of infringing 
files). 
 265 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 938–40; Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021–22 (finding that 
Napster’s central database index helped copyright infringers infringe); Coats et al., supra 
note 14, at 234, 241. 
 266 See supra notes 201–216.  See also Bowrey, supra note 7. 
 267 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 937. 
 268 Id. (finding that the Sony Court did not find intentional inducement despite the 
knowledge of the VCR manufacturer that its device could be used to infringe); see also 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 416, 439 n.19 (1984).  
Recall that “Rip, Mix, Burn” could also mean space-shifting (see supra note 249), which 
many people in the Internet community are aware of.  This leaves only the fact that it 
built an iPod with a large capacity to be used against Apple.  This is evidence of mere 
knowledge since Apple would only be distributing a product capable of infringement. 
 269 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster Ltd. (Grokster II), 380 F.3d 1154, 
1162–63 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that Grokster did not have knowledge at a time when it 
could materially contribute to the infringing activity because the system’s architecture 
would not allow it to maintain an ongoing relationship with its users). 
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“substantially participated” in the infringement or have provided 
the “site and facilities” for the conduct to continue.270 
3. The Inducement Doctrine as a Rebuttal to the Sony Defense 
Taking what was learned from the application of traditional 
contributory infringement above, the elements of the inducement 
theory will again be applied.  First, Apple did not court copyright 
infringing users with its advertisement or by building the Apple 
TV with a large capacity.  This is evidence of constructive 
knowledge at best and intent requires a stronger showing, such as 
the direct assistance Grokster gave copyright infringing users.271  
Inquiry into the next two factors requires the first element to 
succeed as evidence of Apple’s intent to induce because those are 
the affirmative steps Apple would be making to encourage 
infringement.272  But now that the requisite intent is not met, the 
fact that the Apple TV could have been designed differently to bar 
copyright infringement, or that it receives a large portion of its 
revenue from the iPod’s infringing uses will not by themselves 
prove contributory infringement.273  Unless evidence of the last 
two factors is probative enough, Apple is most likely shielded from 
liability under Sony.274  Moreover, because Apple took affirmative 
steps to prevent copyright infringement, including advertised use 
of the Apple TV with iTunes, it is likely that evidence of the last 
two factors would not be enough to implement Apple. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court meant for the Grokster III holding to be 
read as a rebuttal to the Sony defense under the theory of 
contributory liability.  The contributory liability theory provides 
 
 270 Id. 
 271 See supra notes 153–159 and accompanying text. 
 272 Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 938–41 & n.12. 
 273 See id. 
 274 Id. at 935 (holding that, “where evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or 
the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions 
directed to promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability.”  
Apple does not meet this standard). 
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significant background in differentiating between the actual 
knowledge, constructive knowledge, mere knowledge, and intent a 
producer may have to determine its ultimate liability.  To apply the 
inducement theory as a separate theory of secondary liability 
would give plaintiffs a new cause of action like the “fake 
complaint” drawn up by the EEF.275  Misunderstanding the 
inducement theory would probably eliminate the balance Sony 
intended to maintain: between protecting innovation and providing 
for dissemination.276  Reading the decision inaccurately would 
preclude the distribution of products worthy of the Sony defense.  
And indeed, a number of cases that have applied the Grokster III 
decision properly read the inducement theory as a part of the 
traditional test for contributory infringement.277  In Grokster III, 
the majority opinion did not revisit the Sony decision, but it did not 
intend to overrule it either.278  The Court did not intend for the 
Grokster III decision to enjoin the distribution of interactive media 
players, like the Apple TV.279  Of course, whether a product is 
entitled to the Sony protection because it is capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses or because it is 
capable of substantial noninfringing uses is for the courts to decide 
on a case-by-case basis.280  The different theories of contributory 
infringement, though, set boundaries on that entitlement.281  And it 
is those boundaries that limit the abuse of Sony and allow 
 
 275 See supra note 201. 
 276 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 416, 442 (1984). 
 277 Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., No. 03-2670, 2006 WL 842883 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 31, 2006); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006); see 
Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 278 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 934 
(2005). 
 279 Grokster III at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that Sony shelters MP3 players); 
see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913, (No. 04-480) 
(questioning plaintiffs’ proposed test for a “majority use [that is] noninfringing.”  Justice 
Breyer argues that it presents problems for the iPod inventor who cannot gauge its 
unforeseen uses before he has invented it). 
 280 See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934 (majority opinion) (holding that it will not revisit 
Sony and quantify its holding to settle the split in the courts.  Instead, it will leave it to 
further consideration when it may be required). 
 281 See, e.g., id. at 934–95 (stating that nothing in Sony precludes evidence of intent to 
hold a producer liable); A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 
1020–21 (9th Cir. 2001) (requiring a showing of actual knowledge of infringing activity 
to overcome a Sony defense). 
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legitimate technologies to further develop.282  Manufacturers and 
distributors of digital technology today, like Apple CEO Steve 
Jobs, are therefore freer to continue re-inventing products of 
information technology. 
 
 282 See generally Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934 (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s view of 
Sony “was error, converting the case from one about liability resting on imputed intent to 
one about liability on any theory.”  But Sony did not displace other theories of secondary 
liability). 
